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ABSTRACT
Empirical results of the concept of territorial capital suggest that the Hungarian regional 
economic development is defined by the coopetitive networks of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Therefore, overall purpose of this paper is to scrutinize theoretically 
and empirically on one hand the structural characteristics of the Hungarian coopetitive 
networks of SMEs, on the other hand is to analyze effects of the networks of same firms 
on regional economic development. Altogether three Hungarian coopetitive networks of 
SMEs were found and analyzed longitudinally embracing 127 entrepreneurs thus 127 
interviews and 127 questionnaires were conducted as well. Since the coopetitive networks of 
enterprises have territorial extension, the advanced methods of network science and spatial 
econometrics were combined. The key findings show that focal firm plays outstanding role 
in redistributing market information, organizing mutual transportation and guarantees 
robustness of the coopetitive networks. Finally, the coopetitive networks of SMEs determine 
significantly the new jobs creation and pay raise, in general, the accumulation of territorial 
capital at regional scale as well. 
Keywords: Nodal regional economic growth, Spatial network analysis, Coopetitive networks, 
Power-law degree distribution
JEL Classification: D62, F12, L24, P13 
1. INTRODUCTION
The Hungarian regional economic development and growth are determined by the inter-
firm relationship (Jóna, 2015a; Jóna, 2015b), thus the paper theoretically and empirically 
concentrates on scrutinizing the Hungarian coopetitive networks of SMEs and the effects of 
the networks of rival firms on the regional economic growth. The coopetition has occurred 
as a new category in the terminology system of social sciences that refers to the special 
dynamic interplay between same firms in which the competitors collaborate and compete 
with each other simultaneously (Bradenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Gnyawali & Park, 2011; 
Pathak-Wu & Johnston, 2014, Raza-Ullah, Bengtsson & Kock, 2014; Lindström & Polsa, 
2015; Gnyawali, Madhavan, He & Bengtsson, 2016). By applying coopetition, the market 
automatisms do not disappear from economic structure, of course. The competition remains 
in hegemony in the economic setting but in some place of business life the entreprises in 
network of SMEs collaborate to achieve effectively their purposes. The paper concentrates 
only on effects of coopetitive networks on regional economic development but does not 
consider the network evolution. 
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Moreover, well-known fact that every coopetitive network has territorial extension so 
a territory which is covered by a network is has to be named as a nodal region (Nystuen 
& Dacey, 1961; Thilenius, Havila, Dahlin & Öberg, 2016). Since economic networks, 
economic relationships and the territorial concentration of economic activities create 
nodal region, it must be scrutinized by combining toolkits of network science and spatial 
econometrics. Taken together, the paper thus describes impacts of the coopetitive networks 
on the economic development of nodal regions (hereinafter: regions). Spatial extensions of 
the coopetitive networks are illustrated by maps in the paper. 
The overall purpose of this paper is on one hand to scrutinize theoretically and 
empirically operational automatisms of three Hungarian bottom-up coopetitive networks. 
Whereas every coopetitive network possesses geographical extension, these are dissected by 
applying advanced (both basic and novel) toolkits of spatial network analysis to understand 
architectures and territorial impacts of coopetitive networks. On the other the paper 
elaborates a network measurement model with which spatial effects of coopetitive networks 
can be operationalized longitudinally as well.
2. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS AND EMPIRICAL OVERVIEWS 
Empirical results of the concept of territorial capital suggest (Jóna, 2015a; Jóna, 2015b) 
that the Hungarian regional economic growth and development have been determined by 
networking of the small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)3. More precisely, the inter-
firm relationship has outstanding role in the regional economic growth therefore the methods 
of network science must be applied to analyze trajectory of regional economic development 
(Stimson, Stough & Nijkamp, 2011; Stimson, 2014). 
At first time Hakansson and Snehota (1995) concentrated on examining the evolving of 
the business networks theoretically and empirically, the basic information and characteristics 
of the entrepreneurial networks were mustered by them. They stress that the business network 
is not ‘an island but a multiple system’ encompassing human being with emotion, regional 
past, traditions, special socialization, etc (Hakansson, 2015). It is clear, the entrepreneurial 
decisions, performances and the networking can be determined by on one hand exogenous 
and endogenous assets and on the other hand regional proximities as well (Boschma, 2005; 
Torre, 2008; Torre, 2011; Bernela & Levy, 2015); these usually have to be taken into account 
by the regional economic analysis.
It has to be emphasized that the networks of companies have spatial components 
and dimensions, in the early 1960s so many scholars described and concentrated on it 
(Haggett & Chorley, 1969). Notwithstanding, this perspective had lasted only a few years 
and the academic investigations subsequently focused on innovation potential of networks. 
Nowadays, increasing number of papers has again dealt with territorial effects and patterns 
of the network of SMEs; the network approach in researches has been shifting fast in this 
field.
Furthermore, the networking of firms has been configured in every type of regions, 
numerous empirical studies corroborate that social and economical bonds have been formed 
among local small enterprises in peripheral, semi-peripheral and core regions as well (Dubois, 
2015). Eventually, it seems nowadays the SMEs’ networking can be reveled irrespective of 
territorial development level.
Moreover, as the network structure is analyzed intensively in the next chapters, the scale-
free architecture of network has to be understood adequately. Obviously, the random graph 
theory cannot describe the network scheme in the nature but the Barabási-Albert model 
3 According to the Hungarian law system, the SMEs can be defined as firms that have no more 250 employees or its balance sheet total is no 
more the 43 million Euro/year. The paper accepts this definition.
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can grab it (Albert & Barabási, 2002). Fundamentally, the scale-free network structure can 
be defined as power-law degree distribution. The degree distribution illustrates how often 
nodes occur with varying edges in a certain network. Simply put, usually one or only some 
nodes have a large number of connections in the network, in so doing, most of the agents 
have only a few links thus hubs (high degree nodes is called hub) are formed that guarantee 
the robustness and integration of the network. The power-law degree distribution system 
is usually evolved by preferential attachment automatisms referring to the more connected 
players, the more likely it is to receive new and new ties (Albert, Jeong & Barabási, 2000). 
Consequence of the scale-free network topology is that the robustness of network becomes 
high. More precisely, in the network of SMEs there is a focal firm that is known by everyone 
in the network, playing prominent role in the allocation of information, organizing, 
coordinating and integrating the actors of network. Ultimately, the dominant firm (the hub) 
is defined as the Achilles Heel of network of SMEs (Albert et al., 2000; Albert & Barabási, 
2002) since it is the main actor in the network.
The scale-free network structure has advantages and drawbacks as well. Barabási (2015) 
accentuates advantages of scale-free network architecture finding out that the power-law 
degree distribution can protect network against random attacks. In general, if an actor is 
gone out of the network by a random attack, the network can operate on because the 
network loses a node with a few connections. It is because, most likely, a member with a 
few connections would be attacked thus the network lost low value. Moreover, the paper 
emphasizes that scale-free property shows that the focal firm that integrates and manages 
the network.
Finally, the functions of focal firm belong to intensive academic dispute. On one hand 
numerous scholars (Hakansson-Snehota, 1995; Hakansson, 2015) argues that central firm 
can create dictatorship within the network, on the other hand Barabási (2015) notes that 
scale-free topology provides robustness of graph thus it can protect itself against different 
attacks.
Nowadays, the entrepreneurial alliances have meaningful role in the bargaining, by 
collaborating with each other so that SMEs could take the best bargaining power against 
certain service providers (such as electricity, gas and central heating companies). For example, 
if local SMEs corporate with each other to reach cheaper services, certain services provider 
may treat them as a vast venture thus the lower prices will be provided for the players of 
networks. The Hungarian law system absolutely permits the entrepreneurs to corporate 
with each other in such way and to decrease their expenditure. Actually, the corporation 
of competitors brings confidence relations, new possibilities and positive externalities for 
enterprises by at interregional level as well (Karlsson, Johansson & Staught, 2005).
The networking of SMEs facilitates the cooperation in some fields such as cost 
transaction and mutual transportation, risk reducing, collective learning (Hakansson, 
2015), knowledge spillover (Carrington & Scott, 2005), product development (Jackson & 
Watts, 2002), technical shifts, information changes, R&D collaboration and adaptation of 
innovation (Karlsson et al., 2005). Moreover, within the inter-firm network so many formal 
and informal communication channels can be formed so that the entrepreneurs could share 
market information and knowledge spillover effect could be evolved as well. Marshall’s early 
profound work argues that the regional inter-firm relationship might promote to the internal 
economies of scale and the accumulation of endogenous assets as well (Marshall, 1930). 
In this respect, the proximity has meaningful function in the networking of SMEs. The 
proximity has so many types in the modern regional studies; Boschma (2005) distinguishes 
social, cognitive, organizational, institutional and geographical proximities. Those networks 
of SMEs manage to work successfully in practice which struggle that the above mentioned 
proximities prevail between firms. The related literature, in particular the French School of 
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Proximity (Torre, 2008; Torre, 2011; Bernela & Levy, 2015), accentuates that in these days 
the role of technological proximity has been emerging so the combinations of proximities 
define evolution and function of the networks of entrepreneurs. When these proximities 
evolve at inter-firms level, bottom-up networks can be established contributing to the 
accumulation of territorial capital and to the equilibrium of regional economic development. 
For example, Czernek and Czakon (2016) underscore in their case study that some Polish 
coopetitive networks of SMEs (for instance in the tourism sector) can operate well if among 
firms exist emotional and physical proximities; this condition causes trust-building between 
firms defining regional economic growth. In such socioeconomic circumstances the networks 
of SMEs could be easily formed as well. Moreover, other scholars highlight that the physical 
and cognitive proximity determine the knowledge sharing, investments and complementary 
capabilities, furthermore ‘when cultural sensitivity is low, psychic distance takes on greater 
importance in attenuating relationship value, whereas when cultural sensitivity is high 
psychic distance has no discernible effect’ (Skarmeas, Zeriti & Baltas, 2015). To sum, the 
proximities can impact significantly on the qualities of inter-relations in the networks of 
firms.
Significant close connection is recognized between the networks of SMEs and regional 
economic growth; it can be proved by not only conceptually but also by empirically as 
well. Tangible examples of the economic networking are the Silicon Valley and Hollywood 
(Cohen & Fields, 1999); 80 percent of the Italian agricultural sector based on small family 
business (Ciravegna, Lopez & Kundu, 2014; Gurrieri, 2014; Campopiano, Massis & Cassia, 
2016) and almost whole Danish economic structure has been based on the networks of 
SMEs (Chetty, Partanen, Rasmussen & Servais, 2014). Finally, the network of SMEs and its 
spillover effects are found in all economic systems around the world so it works in practice 
as well.
A large number of theoretical and empirical investigations confirm that the SMEs’ 
networking has meaningful role in the regional economic development but only the 
networking is not enough. The network of SMEs has to be embedded in the social and 
economic structure in order that the synergy effect could escalate and thus a region can step 
on a stable and harmonic development trajectory (Meschi & Wassmer, 2013). Embeddedness 
of a network means that the entrepreneurs of network and their acts are accepted fully 
by the local residents and communities thus the networks are integrated in the multiple 
regional settings (Granovetter, 1985); the networks of SMEs become the organic component 
of the local traditions, characteristics and milieu. Malecki (2012) suggets that the local 
embeddedness can be defined by social capital that refers to ‘the overlap between the social 
and economic spheres of human life.’ (Malecki, 2012: 1025). Eventually, the topic of local 
embeddedness seems relevant, however, operationalization of its elements are still vague.
On one hand, the structure of economic networks is needed to be analyzed by graph 
theory (Jackson–Watts, 2002), on the other hand, network dynamic formation can be 
scrutinized by the game theory – particularly (non)corporative game theory (Roson & 
Hubert, 2015) – and dynamic models of collective behavior theory (Peter & John, 2005; 
Vega-Redondo, 2007; Goyal, 2007; Jackson, 2008; Bramoullé & Kranton, 2016). The core 
characteristics of complex network method have been improved and summarized by König’s 
so many profound and fundamental papers (König & Battison, 2009).
As above mentioned, the driving force of the Hungarian regional economic growth is the 
networking of SMEs. However, establishment of SME was forbidden in the socialist area, 
meaning that enterprises did not exist formally and there were no networks of companies, of 
course (Kornai, 2008). Furthermore, as the social relationship and face-to-face partnership 
were controlled and managed intensively in total communist dictatorship, the mutual trust 
and personal support, confidence relations and respect were eliminated from the local 
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society and thus the bridegroom entrepreneurs (Hankiss, 2014). After the regime change (in 
1990) the Hungarian local residents could establish firms but they did not have links and 
enough relational capital; SMEs were allowed to be formed but the SMEs networking was 
restricted on account of early wrong political and social experiences (Berend, 1996). This 
multiple situation determined significantly both the fluctuation of entrepreneurship and 
the networking of SMEs. After the regime change, numerous enterprises were established 
in Hungary but these had to functionalize almost total alone because entrepreneurs did 
not believe in each other, the inter-firm nexus has not been configured easily. Ultimately, 
the social network of entrepreneurs has been specified by the communist heritages. The 
communism had been over but the socialist socio-cultural and personal effects have remained 
in the Hungarian patterns of connections.
Notwithstanding, I managed to find three bottom-up, supply-oriented coopetitive 
networks of SMEs (hereinafter coopetitive networks of SMEs) that have been functionalizing 
as real networks; it proves as well that the Hungarian SMEs’ networking has already begun.
In the next sections the paper demonstrates on one hand how dataset of the networks 
was collected and analyzed; on the other hand the paper focuses on investigating structural 
features of the coopetitive networks of SMEs such as topology, robustness, functions, 
centralities and small-world-effects of the networks. Afterwards, the chapter of result 
characterizes and compares above mentioned three Hungarian coopetitive networks of SME 
and describes how SMEs’ networking impact on regional economic growth. 
3. METHODS AND MODEL OF NETWORK
The primary network dataset was assembled as follows. Employing my informal friendship 
including so many enterprises I found four collaborating same firms. Firstly I fixed up and 
conducted interviews separately with them and after that I asked entrepreneurs for telling me 
who else belong to this informal network. By following snowball method, three bottom-up, 
coopetitive networks of SMEs were revealed. Nevertheless, quantitative (questionnaires) and 
qualitative (sociological semi-structured interviews) methods were applied simultaneously 
in order to the characteristics of the coopetitive networks can be understood in-depth 
(Paula, 2015; Smith & McKeever, 2015; Sanou, Le Roy & Gnyawali, 2015); the paper 
prefers micro-geographic approach. Basically, the primary database includes 127 interviews 
and 127 questionnaires. In general, the questionnaire consists of basic information of firms 
such as postal code, street, house number of firm location, number of employees, annual 
income, etc., while the interviews map out the nature of links between same companies. The 
interviews lasted 110 minutes on average, the longest one is 4 and a half hours, the shortest 
one is 55 minutes. The database was collected between April and September 2015.
Nevertheless, the paper accepts statement that almost every network of SME has spatial 
extension thus toolkits of network science and spatial econometrics are combined. The first 
network is located from Tihany to Budapest (network of Budapest and Tihany: NTHBP), 
the second one exists in Nyíregyháza (network of Nyíregyháza: NNYH), and the third 
network is situated in Budapest (network of Budapest: NBP). NTHBP embraces 72 firms, 
NNYH consists of 14 firms, and NBP includes 41 firms, all together (72+14+41=127) 
127 enterprises belong to the research model. In a nutshell, NTHBP={1,2,3…72}, 
NNYH={1,2,3,…14}, and NBP={1,2,3,…41}. Moreover, these have to be defined as 
disjoint sets, so NTHBP∩NNYH∩NBP, meaning that the networks could be analyzed 
separately and compared to each other in the next sections. 
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All of three unintentional coopetitive networks of SMEs are regarded as unweighted 
and undirected graphs4 referring to the interaction is mutual among firms, nodes are in 
symmetric relationship. In this model: GNTHBP,NNYH,NBP=(V,E), where G is graph, V are vertices 
and E is edge. In this case V means firms and E means link among firms. More precisely, the 
vertices mean premises of firms and the edge refers to coopetitive interactions between firms. 
Basically, on one hand the paper scrutinizes relation structure of inter-firms and quality 
of bonds, on the other hand quantifies how inter-firms nexus affects regional economic 
development. 
The structural properties of the coopetitive networks of SMEs can be gauged by degree 
centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, the Duranton-Overman index, geodesic 
distance, average degree, small world, graph density, scale-free network topology and the 
large of network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Vega, 2007; König & Battison, 2009; Barabási, 
2015; Jackson, 2016). In this vein, the paper accepts that the network structure determines 
significantly the network functions. In this chapter their calculations are demonstrated.
The actor centrality and player position in the network can be operationalized by three 
paths, such as degree centrality, betweenness centrality and closeness centrality. The degree 
centrality with Freeman centralization (CD) stresses that the network activity depends on 
in-degree (how many players choose him/her) (Wassermann & Faust, 1994), it has to be 
calculated: , where CD is the group centrality, CD (n*) is the highest 
degree in a certain network and g expresses the number of players of network. CD’s value 
can be 0 and 1, where theoretical value 1 demonstrates that the focal firm belongs to every 
enterprise but others do not know each other (Scott, 2000). Moreover, the closeness centrality 
CC highlights that a firm has central position in the graph if a company can be accessed easily 
thus it can gather and distribute directly adequate and important market information. The 
closeness centrality has a well-known formula:  where g is a distance 
and i and j show the distance between actors. In addition, the betweenness centrality CB 
expresses that those player has power in the graph and can control network evolution as 
well who is located among numerous other actors. Its equation can be described as this way 
 where i≠j, l≠j and gij (nj) expresses the number of the shortest edges between 
i and j (Balakrishnan & Ranganathan 2012).
The paper emphasizes that eigenvector is not being calculated because a few number of 
agents take part in these coopetitive networks.
Furthermore, in the spatial econometrics well-known Duranton-Overman index [K̂(d)-
index] is employed to analyze the territorial concentration of SMEs. Its formula can be 
described as , where f is a Kernel function, h stands for 
the optimal bandwidth, i and j show the geographical distance between firms (Scholl-Garas-
Schweitzer, 2015: 8).
The small world of network refers to the distance between hubs so it can be obtained if 
we divide local clustering coefficient by average path. In case of undirected graph the local 
clustering coefficient (Ci) refers to ‘the extent to which one’s friends are also friends of each 
other’ (Watts & Strogatz, 1998) so  Finally, 
the global value of Ci is obtained: . Nevertheless, in the case of undirected 
graph the average path AP can be counted this way: APi,j=APj,i so the well-known formula 
4 The notions of graph and network emerge synonyms in this paper.
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can be obtained: . It contributes to calculate the small word (SW) by 
employing above mentioned equitation:  (Watts, 2016).
Moreover, the graph density (D) compares the number of edges to the maximal number 
of edges, so: . Besides, the average degree of undirected graph:  and 
the large (L) of network can be obtained: .
Finally, the scale-free network architecture can be measured by the well-know 
mathematical formula (Csermely, London, Wu & Uzzi, 2013; Barabási, 2015): 
, P presents probability, k is a constant, T is a certain variable, and – α is exponent of power 
function. In the nature, the value of  is between 2 and 3 consistently. The paper accepts and 
applies this premise.
After the presentation of quantitative methods, now the qualitative toolkits are illustrated. 
The face-to-face sociological, semi-structured interviews were conducted as well. By 
applying the qualitative design, on one hand, the personal narratives and the socioeconomic 
circumstances can be taken into account (Yin, 2011). On the other hand, the interviews 
serviced to map out informal relationships and positions of agents in network; the informal 
bonds of network can be investigated scientifically with qualitative method (Gilleskie & 
Zhang, 2009; Badev, 2013; Qu & Lee, 2015; Ciliberto, Murry & Tamer, 2015) and it is 
applied systematically.
The qualitative dataset is elaborated by both the structured content analysis and 
qualitative input-output analysis. The dimensions of interviews are structured as follows: 
• introduction,
• network evolution,
• collaborating with competitors, 
• horizontal network structure,
• business model,
• the network effect on the income and establishing of new jobs.
The next chapters provide insight into the empirical results, more precisely, the topology 
of three Hungarian coopetitive networks of SMEs and the impacts of the networks on the 
regional economic growth.  
    
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
4.1 The coopetitve network of SMEs between Tihany and Budapest
Tihany has always been a typical ecclesiastical and historical middle-sized town in 
Hungary; it is located in a peninsula of the north-Balaton Lake approximately 140 km far 
from Budapest (capital of Hungary). The local society of Tihany can be called special too, 
consisting of few priestly elite and a large number of citizens who had been living under 
the Hungarian average living standards (Horváth, 2015). Of course, in center of Tihany 
can be found some popular and rich tourist destinations but the old and bigger element 
of the settlement is underdeveloped; huge territorial and social disproportion appeared in 
Tihany. Nevertheless, this sad socio-economic circumstance has been reshaped basically 
by a very successful entrepreneur of Budapest who was born in Tihany. He decided on 
establishing a new local market in Tihany where the poor local inhabitants could sell their 
old and handmade products, odds and ends, vegetables and fruits from home gardens etc. 
Put another way, because of the new local market overwhelming of unemployed local people 
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started working at new market and became entrepreneur and taxpayer citizens, moreover, 
they have been able to sign on further unemployed people of Tihany. Spread of the local 
entrepreneurship and the new marketplace have led to eliminate the poverty and regional 
inequalities. As a whole, the regional economic development could start in Tihany because 
of the coopetition.
It has to be emphasized that the local market was formed in 2008 but the solvent demand 
misses therefore owner of new market managed to invite his VIP friends from Budapest so 
that elite of capital could purchase local residents’ productions and as a result the local 
market has expanded; relational capital of the owner has been converted into economic 
capital. As a consequence, some successful enterprises of Budapest have been interested in 
selling products at new market of Tihany so nowadays approximately 20% of the NTHBP 
come from Budapest.
Interestingly, the NTHBP is similar to the www.amazon.com, that is based on coopetition 
business strategy, both offer places for actors of supply side so that customers and sellers 
could meet and do business with each other (Ritala, Golman & Wegmann, 2014). The core 
difference between both is that the NTHBP provides physical market for firms while the 
www.amazon.com offers only Internet territory.
Indeed, the NTHBP has to be defined as an unintentional coopetitive network of SMEs 
because its counterparts collaborate with each other to mutual transportation of goods so as 
to reach higher profit. Since the mutual transportation, a typical form of coopetition, prevails 
in the all three Hungarian coopetitive networks, the mechanisms of mutual transportation 
of goods have to be scrutinized thoroughly at this point. 
Initially, SMEs of the coopetitive network understand that the price of transportation 
(expenditure) can be reduced by mutual transportation. So, when products start running out, 
an entrepreneur (usually focal firm of the network) books orders and musters the needed list 
of goods. Just as many trucks are used for transporting goods that is enough for delivering 
the ordered volume of products, as a result, savings can be realized collectively. For example, 
in the NTHBP usually 57 trucks deliver goods for 72 firms thus the cost of transportation 
and amortization of 57 trucks have to be paid by 72 enterprises. By sharing and reducing 
transportation cost, firms can save financial resources to establish new workplaces or to 
increase income of their employees. 
Arguable, the focal firm has crucial function in the coopetition in Hungary. The role of 
dominant firm (sometimes it is called as broker by Madhavan, Gnyawali & He, 2004; Choi 
& Wu, 2009; Pathak et al., 2014) can be identified adequately by scrutinizing architecture 
of the NTHBP. As Figure 1 shows, the NTHBP has scale-free property referring to that 
only one agent (namely the focal firm) in the network has a large number of coopetitive 
connections, conversely, numerous nodes have only a few coopetitive links.
Figure 1. Topology of the NTHBP
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Figure 1. The topology of NTHBP
Source: Own Elaboration
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Simply put, the dominant firm, owner of new marketplace, is known and trusted fully 
by everybody in the NTHBP but the entrepreneurs do not trust in each other. As already 
indicated, it is because on one hand these entrepreneurs have been socialized in distrustful 
milieu of communism, on the other the rivals’ relationships are not friendly. Therefore, the 
focal firm mediates among firms in the network and can build bridge among competitors; 
the hub is the Achilles Heel in the coopetitive network. It can be lighted by a part of an 
interview. 
‘I hate C. J. (name of an entrepreneur was mentioned) because she deceived me 
a lot earlier. We hate each other. But I know A. P. (name of focal firm of the 
NTHBP was mentioned) who also knows C. J. I know that mutual transportation 
always brings me huge profit but I cannot negotiate with her so A. P. manages 
transportation between us. A. P. is a really good man, I trust him. He asks me 
and C. J. what we need next weekend and these are transported for us. But I 
never negotiate with C. J. but the mutual transportation works because A. P. 
helps and mediates between us!’ (121st interview)
Basically, the focal firm guarantees integration and robustness of the network (Pachura, 
2010). Formally, the central firm organizes mutual transports so that price reduction and 
profit maximization can be reached by all entrepreneurs in the NTHBP.
The NTHBP is defined territorially because it consists of 72 enterprises (57 from Tihany 
and 15 from Budapest) but only some firms of Budapest have coopetitive nexus with 
enterprises of Tihany. More specifically, the NTHBP might be divided into two subgraphs 
territorially. The first subgraph can be found in Budapest, another one is revealed in Tihany 
and the two subnetworks are integrated by the focal firm (red point in Figure 2) thus the 
NTHBP become a connected network.
Figure 2. Spatial extension of the NTHBP
Source: Own Elaboration
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In other words, numerous inter-relation ties can be emerged within both subgraphs but 
only a few bonds exist between subgraphs but everyone knows focal firm. Framework of the 
coopetitive networks is illustrated by the Table 1.
Table 1. Some spatial parameters of three coopetitive networks
N L 〈k〉 CDF CB CC
K̂ (d)-
index D APt CLt SWt P
NTHBP 72 1742 48,38 0,73 1,93 0,82 0,19 0,69 1,36 2 0,4264 1,6314T¯2,135
NNYH 14 91 13 1 4 1 0,41 1 1 1 1 -
NBP 41 431 21,02 0,64 1,11 0,71 0,23 0,53 1,44 2 0,2361 1,4871T¯2,018
Source: Own Elaboration
To date, the NTHBP possesses domestic and international reputation showing a large 
number of the elites, VIPs and celebrities have already visited to purchase and meet friends 
at local market. The solvent demand and urban milieu can be improved intensively and the 
NTHBP promotes to the value creation, values capture and value appropriation at regional 
level.
4.2 The coopetitive network of SMEs in Budapest
The actors of the NBP sell wine establishing in 2008 and encompass 41 same firms. The 
unintentional coopetition of NBP was constituted for mutual transportation so NBP similars 
to the NTHBP. A central firm of the NBP manages mutual transport thus wine has not been 
needed to transport separately so the partners of the NBP could save price of fuel to invest 
in creating new workplaces (Thornton, Henneberg & Naudé, 2015). Basically, partners of 
the NBP compete fiercely on quality, price and value but collaborate in the sphere of mutual 
transportation simultaneously so it has to be called a dynamic coopetitive network of SMEs.
By dissecting architecture of the NBP, scale-free network topology can be found again. 
Dominant firm in the NBP is the Achilles Heel so robustness of the NBP is so high. The R2, 
coefficient of determination, demonstrates how regression line fits the primarily database so 
it is able to describe the real conditions in the NBP statistically (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Topology of the NBP
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Source: Own Elaboration
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The NBP is determined territorially meaning that actors of the network locate in the 5th, 
6th and 9th (the most developed) districts. Besides, the focal firm (red point in Figure 4) is 
situated in the 2nd district, the richest place of Budapest. In this respect, the Hungarian élite 
prominent function in the regional economic development nowadays. This map (Figure 4.) 
suggests that focal firm organizes coopetition in the NBP; all entrepreneurs of this network 
operate as ‘an island’ in practice (Hakansson & Slehota, 1995) due to mistrustful of inter-
firms. Irrespective of salient tension, the NBP can functionalize because the central firm 
brings so strong cohesion power and high robustness in the network.
Figure 4. Spatial extension of the NBP
Source: Own Elaboration
Finally, the Marshall-Arrow-Romer specialization externalities (so-called the localization 
economies of scale) has been revealed on territory of the NBP because of coopetition and 
that has led regional economic growth.
4.3 The coopetitive network of SMEs in Nyíregyháza
The entrepreneurs of NNYH sell perfumes, establishing with 14 members in 1993, so far 
the number of entrepreneurs has not been changed and the NNYH has been operating 
without any formal contracts. The NNYH can be named as very special coopetitive network 
of SMEs due to entrepreneurs of the NNYH are Christians following strongly the dogmas 
of Church thus it should be called as a closed network of companies. This closeness has to 
be explained by the religion since Christian entrepreneurs of the NNYH do not cooperate 
with non-Christians. The results of structured content analysis and qualitative input-output 
analysis of interviews suggest clearly that non-religious entrepreneurs attempted to engage 
in coopetition but the Christian entrepreneurs did not trust them. 
Journal of Spatial and Organizational Dynamics, Vol. V, Issue 3, (2017) 189-207
200
‘A lot of local entrepreneurs have been trying to enter our informal alliance but 
we refused it because we do not believe in them. We have special Christian 
value-system, they do not have like this. We are afraid that they would abuse 
harmfully our network so we protect our Christian system and thus network.’ 
(39th interview)
Evolution of the NNYH is so interesting. Initially, an entrepreneur’s truck broke down 
and could not purchase products but a same firm in Nyíregyháza brought goods to him 
irrespective of competing with each other on the market. The competitors have afterwards 
begun to distribute market information relating to which wholesale provide discount. He 
did it because they were Christian; in the first period the coopetition was configured and 
inspirited by Christian theorem and not by economic interdependence in the NNYH. 
Nowadays all entrepreneurs in the NNYH engage in coopetition because they have 
understood that rivals’ cooperation can bring mutual benefits. To be precise, two coopetitive 
activities can be distinguished in the NNYH such as mutual transportation and allocation 
of market information. 
For the first time, the NNYH had scale-free property referring to a focal firm had been 
organizing mutual transportation and allocating market information among same firms. 
However, after a short time, all rivals started cooperating with each other intensively in 
some fields of business life thus they did not need more dominant firm. The central firm 
disappeared because all entrepreneurs of the NNYH trusted in each other and could make 
coopetitive interactions. Trust-building of the NNYH has been accelerated by mutual faith 
therefore the role of central firm was marginalized gradually and the NNYH became a 
complete graph. In the complete network every actor is connected to every other actor; 
every entrepreneur has coopetitive interaction with every entrepreneur in the NNYH. In 
general, the NNYH might have become complete graph so quickly because its entrepreneurs 
have been Christians preferring reciprocal trust and respect as well. 
Indeed, the NNYH has been effective but a static and closed network with only 14 nodes 
in which everyone knows each other; the NNYH has not scale-free scheme. The complete 
graph referring to determines functionalizes of network (Knieps, 2015), on one hand the 
robustness of NNYH is relatively low, and on the other hand it works democratically as 
horizontal bonds emerged among them.
 
‘This is a little alliance in Nyíregyháza, we know. Everybody knows each other, 
but K. D. (the monograph of focal enterprise in NNYH) had been managing 
every issue for some years but later we, all member of the network, have taken 
part organizing mutual transportation. He was the central point in our alliance 
but now we have been able to organize transportation. By doing that, we can 
save a lot of money because eight or nine trucks are enough for moving new 
goods, perfumes, you know… Basically, we do not need contracts; we trust in 
each other regardless of competing with each other too. We collaborate with each 
other in field of transportation and sometimes distribute market information 
where we can buy perfumes cheaper and that’s all but we compete with each 
other in a lot of fields.’ (7th interview)
In addition, the NNYH is located on Örökösföld situated in the most developed district of 
Nyíregyháza (see Figure 5) meaning that the driving force of regional economic development 
comes from the richest areas.
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Figure 5. Spatial extension of NNYH
Source: Own Elaboration
In a nutshell, vertical competition and horizontal cooperation can be revealed and 
merged among entrepreneurs of the NNYH and it has brought financial success to them. 
The cooperation of rivals significantly contributes to appear the localization economies 
of scale (Marshall-Arrow-Romer specialization externalities) on territories of the NNYH 
(Panne, 2004).
4.4 The networks’ effects and regional economic development             
Now paper focuses on quantifying longitudinally how the coopetitive networks of SMEs define 
trajectory of regional economic growth. To date, there is no standard spatial econometrics 
method how the effects of the coopetitive networks of SMEs can be gauged on regional 
economic development (Boucher & Fortin, 2016). In this vein, the paper now attempts 
to quantify network effects. In improved network model, the impact of the coopetitive 
networks of SMEs on the regional economic development is defined by (1) pay raising and 
(2) new jobs creating (Pachura, 2010). Actually, the applied network model answers the 
question how and to what extent the coopetition strategy defines the change of income and 
employment rate on a certain network territory. 
Basically, the gauging is divided into two components such as quantitative and qualitative 
ones (Thomason, Simendinger & Kiernan, 2013). On one hand the quantitative research 
focuses on employment and income data of the networks, on the other hand the qualitative 
dataset depicts how the regional milieu and atmosphere have been shifted in studies phase. 
The sharp question is how the gross costs of pay rise (PR) and the gross costs of creation 
new workplace (NW) can be financed by saving (S) that comes from coopetitive activities. 
On one hand, the coopetitive activities of firms can be expressed by saving (S), and on the 
other hand PR+NW=GCRD where GCRD is the gross cost of regional development. On 
condition that S ≥ GCRD, then saving can finance absolutely the gross cost of regional 
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development. Of course, if S<GCRD, then S is not enough to cover GCD. Moreover, 
 where GCRD [0,1] shows what proportion the gross costs of pay rise and 
creation new workplace can be covered by saving. The global value of GCRD within a time 
period: . The Figure 6. reports the longitudinal changing of GCRD, obviously, the 
NNYH is the most successful in savings.
Figure 6. What proportion can the gross costs of pay rise and creation new workplace be financed by 
savings? (%)
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The Figure 6. demonstrates that in 2014 the 52.98% of pay rise and new job creation (in 
applied network model these variables operationalize the regional economic development) 
could be financed by the savings in the NNYH. Moreover, in same time the 45.83% of the 
regional economic development were covered by coopetitive accomplishment in the NTHBP. 
Lastly, the 46.47% of regional economic development could be financed by the coopetitive 
business strategy in the NBP. It is clear that coopetition in the practice has provides economic 
possibilities so that firms could expand market or create new marketplace, raise income and 
employee rate.
The quantitative data collection provides insight into the employment rate of three 
coopetitive network separately. According to the data, the NTHBP has creates 136 new 
workplaces in which 26 were established in Budapest; NNYH could form 97, while 54 new 
jobs were constituted by the NBP. In a nutshell, the coopetitive actions of firms significantly 
contribute to the job creation.
Interestingly, the influence of financial economic crisis of 2008-2009 was not strong 
on accomplishment of the coopetitive networks. The capacities of NTHBP and NBP were 
picking up sharply while the performance of NNYH was falling slightly under the period of 
economic crisis. Put another way, the coopetitive network effects were stable on the regional 
economic development irrespective of the global financial crisis.
In parallel, the qualitative results show that the regional milieu and atmosphere were 
reshaped in Tihany. The local attitude has been changed and urban habit was emerging 
meaning that local residents have started following modern life style but retaining their 
traditions and past simultaneously. In a nutshell, qualitative research findings demonstrate 
that the new local marketplace has been able to modify the conservative image in Tihany by 
forming a special mixed form of the modern and historical conventions with local folklore. As 
a whole, the coopetitive networks have a qualitative spillover-effect namely these contribute 
to the strengthening of the local social integration.
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‘Since when I started working at new local market, Tihany has received a new 
face because a lot of celebrities come to visit and buy something. They bring new 
fashion, new ideas and mood and moral. It is true, the new style has not been 
supported by everyone in the town but it does not matter. The point is that they 
have been able to buy things and thus they give money for the town bringing 
new circumstance and mindset.’ (63rd interview) 
5. CONCLUSION
The Hungarian rivals of networks have already increasingly started understanding and 
exploiting both collaborative and competitive advantages thus contributing to the regional 
economic development directly. It means that relatively developed business culture has been 
appeared and prevailed among the Hungarian small enterprises. In the practice, entrepreneurs 
of coopetitive network share risks, cost and market information so as to maximize their 
profit rate that finally covers the cost of nodal regional economic growth. The empirical 
findings depict on one hand the localization economies of scale emerged on territories of 
the NBP and NNYH, and on the other hand the urbanization economies of scale revealed 
on territory of the NTHBP.
Obviously, year by year financial savings could in every coopetitive network be accumulated 
by coopetitive activities so as to be able to finance both creation of new workplaces and pay 
rising. In particular, the coopetitive networks of same local entrepreneurs have established 
peculiar economic ecosystem and pleasant atmosphere through exploiting both local 
endogenous and exogenous assets as well.
Basically, competitors in coopetitive network collaborate with each other because financial 
resources could be accumulated intensively. In general, their relational capital has been 
converted into economic capital contributing to significantly the increasing the level of local 
welfare. Notwithstanding,  these three coopetitive networks emerge as bottom-up network 
meaning functionalizing without any formal arrangements or official forces apparently. 
Furthermore, it refers to regional politicians, stakeholders and other official members of 
regional economic development might not interfere in formally networking process; these 
coopetitive network operate alone as an ‘island’.
Finally, the accomplishment of bottom-up coopetitive networks might provide a new 
message to both the Hungarian regional policy and territorial planning as well. The local 
SME sector can increasingly control and manage to the regional economic growth thus 
activities of coopetitive network ought to be taken into within a framework of the formal 
Hungarian regional economic development policy account in the future.
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